We use the method of Dominitz and Manski (1996) to solicit anticipated wage distributions for continuing to a Master degree or going to work after completing the Bachelor degree. The means of the distributions have an effect on intention to continue as predicted by theory. The dispersions in these individual distributions have no effect on intention to continue, suggesting that anticipated earnings risk does not play a role in the decision.
Introduction
In a survey among university undergraduates in Beijing, we have asked earnings expectations for two scenarios: go to work after completing their Bachelor degree or finish a Master degree and then go to work. Applying the method developed by Dominitz and Manski (1996) , asking for the probabilities that income will be 25% above or below the expected value, we have an indication of the extent of uncertainty or risk implicit in their anticipated earnings. We relate the intention to continue education for a Master degree to expected earnings and to anticipated uncertainty and find that the former has significant effect and the latter has not.
Our results contribute to a very small literature 1 . After the seminal contribution by Levhari and Weiss (1974) , there was related work by Eaton and Rosen (1980) and Kodde (1985) . Williams (1979) moves away from single up front decision making by applying stochastic dynamic programming. Belzil and Hansen (2002) estimate such a model on American data. Groot and Oosterbeek (1992) extend the basic human capital model with unemployment risk and a wage offer distribution rather than a single given wage. The special issue on Education and Risk published by Labour Economics in 2007 testifies of a growing interest in the topic. Still, many questions are waiting for an answer.
The contribution of this paper is the combination of privately held perceptions on the wage consequences of different schooling scenarios with intended choice for one of these scenarios. This, in our view, has decisive methodological virtue. With our data, there is no need to worry about selectivity in observed wage data, as individuals reveal their private information in the anticipated wage distributions that they provide. A potential drawback is that we use intentions rather than actual outcomes. The effect may be minor in our case, where the time interval between measured intention and actual choice is small. Still, an obvious extension of our work will be to collect to collect data on perceived effects of schooling alternatives and actual choices.
The survey
In June 2007, we held a survey among bachelor students of six universities in Beijing.
We gave out the questionnaires to the Students Affairs Department of the six universities, and let the staff of the department take care of the distribution. We asked them to give out the questionnaires to junior and senior students. At the same time, they should consider major/gender/family background when the respondents were selected. We have no reason to suspect systematic deviation from randomness and certainly not selectivity in relation to anticipated questionnaire answers. 4600 questionnaires were sent out and 4272 valid questionnaires were retrieved, a response rate of 93%. In the survey we asked for personal (demographic) information, family background, plans and ambitions and risk attitudes. We also asked the following question:
We We also ask for plans after graduation as a bachelor. Among our 4272 respondents, 2913
or 68 percent intend to continue their studies while the remaining 1359 or 32 percent plan to start working. The dependent variable in our analysis will be the plan after obtaining the bachelor degree: continue education or work.
In Table 1 we characterise our sample: the variables we use as controls and their means and standard deviations. Bachelor students who plan to work after graduation, rather than continue for a Master degree, come from families with slightly higher average income, lower levels of parental education and occupation and come less often from a large city.
Students in engineering, science and management dominate in our data. All students overrate their academic performance, illustrating a well known phenomenon; but those who plan for work rate themselves lower in academic performance that those who plan for continued education.
The quality of the earnings anticipations
Earlier work has shown that the Dominitz-Manski method generates data of good quality (Dominitz and Manski, 1996; Manski, 2004; Schweri, Hartog and Wolter, 2011; Wolter, 2000; Attanasio and Kaufmann, 2010) . If respondents are not constrained to obey the rules of probability, they may give inconsistent answers, but in the applications so far this appeared to be an insignificant problem, as could be checked by using recording of violations. In Table 2 we collect information on three types of inconsistencies: P(75), P(125) or P(75)+P(125) greater than 100, where P(75) stands for the probability of earnings below 75 percent of the expected value and P(125) for the probability of earnings above 125 percent of the expected value. We do this separately for Bachelor (B) and Master (M), at 0 and 10 years of experience. The scores are cumulative within each column. 784 individuals or 18 percent of the 4272 respondents violate the range restriction of probability at least once 2 . Hence, 82 percent did not violate a range restriction in a survey where we did not explain anything about the nature of probability.
In Schweri, Hartog and Wolter (2011) , 65 percent of the sample of Swiss students never violated the range restriction; however, neither omitting the small group of respondents who committed more than one violation or leaving inconsistent data in and identify such data points with a dummy variable had any effect on the results of that paper. We will apply similar sensitivity checks to our estimates.
The expectations
Each individual provides us with four earnings expectations (conditional on Bachelor or
Master diploma, with 0 and 10 years of experience, indicated as M0B, M10B, M0M and M10M, respectively) and eight probabilities (25% below or above expected earnings, conditional on Bachelor or Master diploma, with 0 and 10 years of experience). We define earnings risk R as the probability of obtaining earnings below 75% or above 125%
of the expected value, by simply adding up the two tail probabilities 3 . We will indicate the four risk measures, similar to expected earnings, as R0B, R10B, R0M and R10M. We will also define simple lifetime measures, by adding up values specified for zero experience and three times the values for 10 years experience, thus assuming a very simple lifetime profile. Discounting without any information on individual variation in discount rates makes no sense, as it would involve the same scaling factor for each individual. Lifetime values, for expected earnings and for probabilities (risk) will be indicated with L replacing 0 or 10. The resulting sample of 3463 observations will be used for the regression analyses below (the "regression sample"). We also have a sample obtained after eliminating answers inconsistent with probability theory, the "no-inconsistency" sample, with 2947
observations.
The means of expected earnings, are presented in The standard deviations of the distributions of lifetime ratios do not differ, but as Figure 1 shows, they hide differences in shape: those who intend to stop have a more spiky distribution. Item non-response is higher among those who intend to go to work than among those who intend to continue school: We know the ratio of lifetime incomes for 59% of the former and for 70% of the latter. derived from gambles with real money, but far from perfectly so Hartog, Ding and Sun, 2010) . We use the response in the field of education. The median value is between 5 and 6 (see Appendix A). If we were to consider a score of 5 as risk neutral, 44% of respondents would be risk neutral, 28% risk averse and also 28% would be risk loving. The distribution would not be symmetric though, but have negative skew.
Is uncertainty relevant? Baseline regressions
Risk attitudes are supposed to have an impact through the response to perceived risk: risk averse individuals should respond more negatively to risk than risk lovers. We acknowledge this by specifying an interaction term for risk and risk attitude:
in interval i, and zero otherwise. Neither risk itself nor interaction with risk attitude has any significant effect. If we plot the coefficients, as in figure 2 , the pattern does hint at systematic effects. The magnitude of the interaction effects decreases with declining risk aversion, and the signs of the coefficients tend to be opposite. Declining magnitudes are in conformity with theory: declining risk aversion should indeed lower the impact of risk.
However, the signs are contrary to expectation: risk in Bachelor earnings should have a positive effect on inclination to continue education, risk in Master earnings a negative effect. Thus, we should conclude that in our data risk does not have the impact on educational choice as theory predicts.
Conclusion
Our conclusion on the key question is quite clear. Anticipated risk, measured as dispersion in the individually anticipated wage distributions for different schooling scenarios, has no effect on the intended schooling choices. Mean earnings, however, do have the effect that theory predicts. We cannot claim causality here, as we cannot rule out that schooling intentions have an impact on stated earnings expectations. Repeating the experiment in different settings is needed to check if our results have general validity. 
